

## **STRATEGIES FOR AMERICAN DOMINANCE:**

### **HENRY KISSINGER-ZBIGNIEW BRZEZINSKI-GRAHAM ALLISON**

Everyone agrees that the USA is a chosen nation, at least those who want to be confirmed in office. Even political enemies like Joe Biden and Donald Trump agree on this; both believe in "American Exceptionalism". For the incumbent president, the United States is "The finest and most unique nation in the world", where religion or ethnicity is irrelevant, where only the ideal of equality for all people counts.

Donald Trump sees his country in a similar light: "America is the greatest and most exceptional Nation in the History of the World"<sup>(1)</sup> .

George W. Bush already declared during his candidature for the presidency: "Almighty God and history have chosen America as a role model for the world". He then understood this as a mandate to use military pressure to bring other countries closer to American values. Patriots have repeatedly invoked the Puritan and Governor of Massachusetts John Winthrop, who spoke of America as the "Shining City on the Hill" in reference to the Bible.

Only President Jimmy Carter wanted to shake his fellow citizens awake when he proclaimed a "Crisis of Confidence" in a major speech. However, he then had no chance of being re-elected: His opponent Ronald Reagan ran in the 1980 election with the slogan that "Providence has destined America to be the greatest country in the world".

Academics have also repeatedly seen America's identity in "American Exceptionalism". For example, Abram Van Engen in his work "City on a Hill: A History of American Exceptionalism". There are exceptions here too, such as the sociologist Daniel Bell. He wrote about "The End of American Exceptionalism" in 1975. However, his son David A. Bell, a professor at Princeton, noted more than a generation later that the belief in their special mission has inspired his fellow countrymen time and again. Others, like

Seymour Martin Lipset, have even attempted to empirically demonstrate America's special advantages. In 2008, Andrew Bacevich, a historian with a military background, wrote his book on "The Limits of Power: The End of American Exceptionalism". However, he also recognised the extraordinary power of the USA, but warned that belief in providence should not lead to hubris and imperialism.

This is about how leading thinkers in American foreign policy want to preserve or expand their country's special position in a changing world, especially in the face of new circumstances. Henry Kissinger and Zbigniew Brzezinski were primarily focussed on the Soviet Union, Graham Allison asks whether there will be a war with China for supremacy in the world

### **1. Henry Kissinger-the realist**

In his habilitation thesis "A World restored; Politics of Conservatism in a revolutionary Age"<sup>(2)</sup> , Kissinger argued that revolutionary France and Napoleon had jeopardised the legitimacy of the existing international order; how the balance of power was destroyed as a result; and what the basic features of a new order in the world should be. Under Napoleon's rule, it was no longer possible for European states to assert their national interests. Only those who submitted to Napoleon's will were safe. After his defeat in Russia, it was clear that he too had his limits; Europe could no longer be ruled by force alone. After the final victory over the Grande Armée, a new balance of power was to deter new aggressors. The aim was to restore stability in Europe after the chaos of the Napoleonic Wars.

Kissinger describes very clearly how the different ideas of the protagonists had to be brought down to a new denominator: Napoleon wanted to create a new order with a strong army. The Russian Tsar Alexander, on the other hand, believed in his divine mission. Both were revolutionaries in their own way because they wanted to overcome the existing order and create a new international system that corresponded to their own ideas. Kissinger's assessment of this development was very realistic and he later agreed with the "school of realists" throughout his life: A statesman should neither

be a conqueror, nor a prophet. No country wants to be dependent on another in the long term. On the other hand, ideologies that consider themselves morally superior claim absolute supremacy. Statesmen such as the English foreign minister Castelreagh and Metternich, on the other hand, sought security and stability in the balance of power. The new international order should be balanced between power and morality, between security and legitimacy.

On the occasion of his death, Heinz Gärtner has written about Henry Kissinger's life in "International"<sup>(3)</sup>. This is about the extent to which Kissinger has remained true to his line as an academic teacher in shaping American foreign policy and as an advisor to various presidents.

As in his habilitation thesis, Kissinger then argued as an academic teacher that politics and diplomacy should be understood as an art and not as an exact science. Reason, creativity and intuition should be combined in a realistic way. Diplomacy is therefore not an exact science in which theories can be applied in a predictable manner. A successful foreign policy must be geared towards utilising different options in different negotiations. Ultimately, it is always about creating a balance of power as the basis for stability.

The Congress of Vienna can serve as a model here. In this sense, alliances can also be changed if the interests of one's own country so require<sup>(4)</sup>. Based on such considerations, Kissinger criticised the then prevailing US nuclear doctrine of "massive retaliation" as early as 1955 in his book "Nuclear Weapons and Foreign Policy" because it was geared towards "all or nothing". His opinion was that there was no difference between a nuclear war on the one hand and total restraint, on the other hand, there had to be intermediate stages. Even if this book met with resistance, Kissinger had established his reputation as an intellectual who endeavoured to find flexible solutions.

The fact that there could also be jealousies between Harvard professors was demonstrated when President John F. Kennedy wanted to bring Kissinger into the White House as an adviser in 1961. His national security adviser at the time, McGeorge Bundy, who also came from Harvard, ensured that Kissinger only played a subordinate role. There were also differences of opinion

between Kissinger and Kennedy when the latter believed that building the Berlin Wall would reduce tensions between East and West, while Kissinger believed that a tougher approach would force Khrushchev to give in. Kissinger was convinced that a tougher stance would better serve America's credibility and Europe's security. If Kissinger had great influence on Nelson Rockefeller and was able to win him over in favour of a moderate stance in foreign policy, he could also advocate a tougher approach if he considered it expedient. He was also always able to differentiate in his personal stance: for example, he publicly supported the war in Vietnam, while telling the American ambassador in Saigon "that we can neither win nor end this war"<sup>(5)</sup> .

When Kissinger then became a decisive shaper of American foreign policy under President Richard Nixon, first as Security Advisor and then as Secretary of State, he maintained his realistic attitude towards the reorganisation of an international order. Nixon also had very realistic ideas about what a future world should look like: the aim was to restore America's leading position, which had been tarnished by the Vietnam War.

In the midst of the Cold War, the basis of international relations should be a balance of power between East and West. At the same time, however, it was also important to ensure that Moscow's influence in the world did not grow without creating new tensions. Above all, opening up to a China then ruled by Mao Zedong meant a reorientation of American security policy.

Kissinger was the right man at the right time, who was particularly adept at combining all these challenges into an overall strategy that was in line with American interests. As National Security Advisor, his initial task was to coordinate the State Department, the Pentagon and the secret services in this direction. This was not easy, if only because Nixon himself had great reservations about these huge bureaucratic institutions, which by their very nature pursued their own policies. In any case, Nixon found in Kissinger an "intellectual partner and an alter ego" in shaping the new American foreign policy<sup>(6)</sup> .

Kissinger and Nixon were realists. Power should serve as the basis of their own foreign policy. This within the framework of the given possibilities, i.e. not to an exaggerated extent, as under Kennedy and Johnson in Vietnam; and also not for moral reasons, as would correspond to the ideals of Woodrow Wilson. Linked to this was a certain scepticism towards a public opinion that could all too easily be manipulated. In this respect, Kissinger was probably also influenced by his youth in the Weimar Republic, where elections could ultimately lead to a totalitarian system.

On this basis, Kissinger and Nixon were able to achieve decisive breakthroughs, such as the recognition of the People's Republic of China. This meant a double success at a time when strong tensions arose between Beijing and Moscow. Beijing's own position was strengthened, while that of the Soviet Union was weakened. From Kissinger's point of view, this strengthening of the USA's own position was also necessary because, although the USA was able to further increase its own economic and military capabilities, the growth of other countries, which were increasingly recovering from the Second World War, was even greater. This ultimately resulted in a relative weakening of the USA, which had to take this development into account. Kissinger repeatedly emphasised the need to negotiate with America's opponents. Ignoring powerful states would be "reckless and pointless", although a strong military should certainly help to strengthen America's credibility.

With this in mind, Kissinger met the Soviet ambassador Dobrynin regularly, often on a weekly basis. These talks probably also took on a special significance because both were convinced that they were the real shapers of their country's foreign policy. In fact, important agreements were signed between Washington and Moscow during this time: The Four-Power Agreement on Berlin; the Treaty on the Non-Proliferation of Nuclear Weapons; disarmament treaties and, above all, the successful conclusion of the Conference on Security and Co-operation in Europe (CSCE) in August 1975, although the official negotiations (in Vienna or Geneva) were often just a "sideshow"; the decisions were made precisely during the talks between Kissinger and Dobrynin.

The extent to which realpolitik guided American foreign policy can be seen, for example, from the fact that Kissinger once emphasised to Chinese Prime Minister Zhou Enlai that in relations with communist countries, the country in question is what counts for the USA, not ideology. When Zhou replied that non-interference in a country's internal affairs is important for China, while the USA's sense of mission repeatedly leads to conflicts, Kissinger agreed with him and said: "We did not seek hegemony in the world, it just happened that way. Our missionary activism has repeatedly led to difficulties"<sup>(7)</sup>. Kissinger saw the limits of American power very clearly, which then became the basis of the Nixon Doctrine: Faraway countries should first make efforts to defend themselves. This also made it possible to make American foreign policy much more flexible, because it was no longer primarily about ideological differences, but about national interests.

This also earned Kissinger the opposition of the first neoconservatives such as Senator Scoop Jackson. Kissinger rejected exaggerated idealism because he was convinced that total victory was not possible in the real world. If you want to enforce Wilson's ideals by force of arms, you forget what the real interests of your own country are, writes Kissinger in his memoirs<sup>(8)</sup>. In this sense, Kissinger spoke out against interference in the internal affairs of the Soviet Union and advised President Ford against receiving the prominent regime critic Solzhenitsyn. If this policy then led to the CSCE, which in turn contributed significantly to the upheavals in Eastern Europe by recognising human rights, this can probably be described as a "trick of history".

But despite all the hostility Kissinger was subjected to, presidents also sought his advice time and again after his time as Secretary of State. He always emphasised that the neoconservatives' idea that one could impose one's own values on others was just as unrealistic as believing that one's own power had no limits<sup>(9)</sup>. Rather, international relations need compromise and coexistence. In this sense, Kissinger has set out his opinion in countless publications and expressed it to American presidents, from George H.W. Bush to Barack Obama: A foreign policy

is successful when negotiations are conducted in such a way that others are also recognised as having rights and armed force is the last resort. With his realism, Kissinger stood for continuity, a pragmatic policy, the lessons of history and the fact that goals take time. Ultimately, it is these fundamentals that could bring our world back from the brink of nuclear war, where we are now.

## **2. Zbigniew Brzezinski-a balance of power is not enough**

The fact that Zbigniew Brzezinski had a different idea than Kissinger of how American supremacy in the world could be secured was set out in particular in his treatise "The Balance of Power Delusion" in 1972, at a time when Kissinger saw the "balance of power" as the basis of his foreign policy. Brzezinski's thoughts were then published as a book in various countries, for example in France under the title "Illusions dans l'équilibre des puissances"<sup>(10)</sup> .

Brzezinski's criticism was once aimed at the fact that the conditions during the Cold War did not correspond to those after the Congress of Vienna and that the USA should therefore endeavour to achieve dominance, not balance. After the Congress of Vienna, there was real multipolarity as the basis of the European balance. Therefore, this system could be considered stable. The system that existed during the 1970s

The "balance of terror", on the other hand, was dominated solely by the USA and the Soviet Union. They alone determined political, economic and military events. They were superior to all other states in terms of power politics and economics and were not dependent on their approval or disapproval.

In addition, the European elites were homogeneous at the time of and after the Congress of Vienna, supported by a self-contained aristocracy and a common ideology. French as the common language of diplomats was also a symbol of a community of values. The Cold War, on the other hand, was characterised by a fierce ideological conflict, which was also determined by different economic systems and hostile military alliances. The Cold War was a global conflict that had no common ground.

In addition, Brzezinski identified a social harmony during and after the Congress of Vienna that made it possible to solve major social problems together. In contrast, the second half of the 20th century was characterised by rapid change in a wide variety of areas, which a static international system could no longer cope with. Brzezinski also refers to this in his book "Out of Control: Global Turmoil on the Eve of the 21st Century" (11).

Even if one categorises these arguments between Brzezinski and Kissinger as an intellectual competition, a not insignificant conclusion emerges: Brzezinski accuses Kissinger of not being up to date with his foreign policy and not taking the necessary tough action against the Soviet Union. Kissinger had therefore also failed with his Vietnam policy and had not correctly categorised the rise of Japan. Instead, America had to fulfil its mission and "carry the torch of freedom into the world". In fact, however, the USA had become increasingly alienated from the world, especially from the newly independent states of the Third World. In this context, Brzezinski has harsh words against the US foreign policy elite, such as Secretaries of State Dean Acheson and John Forster Dulles. They had not understood the change that was taking place and had instead endeavoured to impose their own values on the whole world.

In any case, the USA should take tougher action against the Soviet Union. In times of nuclear armament, Brzezinski also spoke out in favour of dialogue with Moscow, which he considered to be a matter of survival. But the detente, the policy of détente, should not be one-sidedly at the expense of the West, while at the same time Moscow was intervening in the Third World and making considerable territorial gains. Brzezinski's goals were therefore very ambitious: in the aftermath of Vietnam and Watergate, he wanted to re-establish the full hegemony of the United States. These ideas met with resistance from those who, like the grand master of American foreign policy, Averell Harriman, were in favour of better relations with Moscow, but also where President Carter's administration was open to negotiations.



Harriman, who was actively involved in the conferences on the reorganisation of Europe after the Second World War, said quite openly that someone like Brzezinski, of Polish origin, could not judge Russian-American relations objectively. Brzezinski replied dryly that he understood the Soviet Communists at least as well as the capitalist and millionaire Harriman. In fact, Brzezinski has repeatedly called for and adopted a tough stance towards Moscow, as well as working towards a decisive weakening of Russia<sup>(12)</sup> .

Brzezinski was actively involved in strengthening opposition movements in areas where the aim was to weaken Soviet influence. He later argued that Russia's dominance in Eurasia would be massively weakened if it lost its influence over Ukraine. In any case, Russia should be put under constant pressure.

When Soviet influence in Afghanistan became very strong at the end of the 1970s, Brzezinski supported the opposition mujahideen, first with money and then with weapons. After an interview with Brzezinski in the *Nouvel Observateur*, it was even surmised that this support had lured the Russians into the "Afghanistan trap" in the first place. In any case, the Soviet Union suffered a decisive defeat in Afghanistan, which contributed significantly to the dissolution of the state. Brzezinski later had to defend himself against accusations that he had contributed to the strengthening of Islamic fundamentalism through his policies. It is not always easy to judge his policies: for example, he was once simultaneously against official diplomatic talks with the Moscow Foreign Ministry, but very much in favour of secret negotiations conducted through him. In any case, it was he who always recommended a tougher stance towards Moscow to President Jimmy Carter.

As already mentioned, this tougher stance was particularly evident in the support given to the opposition in communist countries such as Poland. The aim was to destabilise the communist bloc. Brzezinski had already led covert disruptive actions at the communist World Youth Festival in Vienna in 1959. Now, as part of a targeted strategy, corresponding actions were to take place throughout the Eastern Bloc. This policy was also

driven by the fact that neo-conservatives and Republicans such as Ronald Reagan criticised the USA for falling behind the Soviet Union as number two.

When the economic difficulties in Poland at the end of the 1970s led to labour protests and the founding of the Solidarnosc trade union, Brzezinski did everything he could to exert pressure on the Kremlin. A Soviet invasion like the one in Czechoslovakia in 1968 was to be prevented at all costs. Brzezinski was in constant contact with the Solidarnosc leadership, the American trade unions (AFL-CIO) were invited to support them, and close contacts were also established with the Catholic Church in Gdansk.

Some of the tough measures initiated by President Jimmy Carter were then often attributed to his successor Ronald Reagan. Why? Because Carter was divided in his foreign policy: Security Advisor Brzezinski stood for a hard line, Secretary of State Cyrus Vance for negotiations. In this sense, Anatoly Dobrynin also wrote in his memoirs: "There was constant competition between Carter's staff for the President's favour, especially where the Soviet Union was concerned. While the American government obviously agreed that Entente meant both rivalry and co-operation, there was no agreement on which emphasis should be placed. For the Security Advisor, the focus was always on global confrontation, while Vance focussed on fundamental cooperation"<sup>(13)</sup>. This view was also confirmed by Vance in his memoirs, whereby he also accused the Security Advisor of having pushed himself too much into the media and into the public eye. Ultimately, the Secretary of State also resigned from his post prematurely<sup>(14)</sup>.

In fact, Brzezinski always had global developments and the associated strategies in mind. He predicted that the most important theatre for the conflicts of the coming decades would be in Eurasia, i.e. in the area between Lisbon and Vladivostok. This would decide which country would lead the world in the future, and he attached crucial importance to supremacy over Ukraine. For him, supremacy over Ukraine was the fundamental prerequisite for hegemony in Eurasia. Therefore, everything had to be done to prevent the dominance of an opposing power over Ukraine. Brzezinski can therefore certainly be seen as a mastermind for

the war in Ukraine<sup>(15)</sup> . He has said it again and again quite openly: without Ukraine, Russia is no longer a dominant power.

In this sense, Brzezinski saw NATO's eastward expansion as a decisive step towards dominance in Eurasia. The end of NATO's eastward expansion would be the end of a comprehensive American policy for the whole of Europe, whereby Ukraine should of course also be included in the negotiations with both the European Union and NATO. A separation of Ukraine from Russia would be a success if only because it would contradict the Russian sense of mission to be the standard bearer of the entire pan-Slavic identity. Without Ukraine, Russia has no chance of restoring the Eurasian empire. Moreover, Russia was now too weak to impose its will on the new states that had become independent after the collapse of the Soviet Union<sup>(16)</sup> . In later publications, Brzezinski could well imagine the further disintegration of Russia.

Born in Poland, he went much further than Kissinger in his opposition to Moscow. If the latter was always keen to establish a "balance of power", Brzezinski initially wanted to undermine the Soviet system and further weaken Russia after its collapse. Nevertheless, he was also always keen to maintain a basis for dialogue with Moscow. He also knew that without these contacts, an adversarial relationship could develop a momentum of its own that would ultimately be detrimental to everyone.

### **3. Graham Allison and the coming war against China**

In 2017, during Donald Trump's first year in office, Graham Allison published his book "Destined for War-Can America and China escape the Thucydides Trap?". What is the core theory of this book? 2500 years ago, Sparta was the leading power in Greece. The rapid rise of Athens to become the new hegemon was to be prevented by all means. This policy led to the Peloponnesian War. The "Thucydides trap" therefore consists of the fact that the fear of a leading power of a new competitor practically inevitably leads to war, whereby three factors are decisive: Interests, fear and a sense of honour<sup>(17)</sup> .

Allison then analyses 16 cases from the last 500 years in which a rising power challenged the ruling power; in twelve of these, war broke out. Only the transition of leadership from Portugal to Spain in the late

The war between England and the United States in the 15th century and the war between England and the United States at the beginning of the 20th century passed off peacefully. There were no major military conflicts during the Cold War either, and the battle for supremacy in Europe between England, France and Germany in recent decades has also been peaceful.

Of course, the question can now be asked as to how far Graham Allison's thesis corresponds to the actual development of events or whether it is more of a schematic representation. Hans-Joachim Diesner describes the origins of the Peloponnesian War quite differently: after the victory over the Persians, Sparta and Athens had formed an alliance, which led to a dualism between the two major Greek powers. Sparta's brusque rejection of Athens' offer of help in suppressing the Helot revolt led to the dissolution of the alliance that had existed since 482 BC and to growing tensions between the two powers. So increased rivalry due to wounded vanity?

In any case, there were then two major alliances in Greece: the Delian-Attic League under the leadership of Athens, whose hegemony became coercive over time. Sparta, on the other hand, dominated the Peloponnesian League. According to Diesner, the opposition between these alliances also had important economic reasons. Greece had become too small to allow several expanding powers to gain the necessary power over people and space at the same time<sup>(18)</sup>. The struggle for raw materials and markets intensified. In order to survive in this process, Athens expanded its fleet and the naval alliance. Economic and trade policy considerations went hand in hand with military ones. The conflict between Athens and Sparta erupted in several wars of limited scope after 460 BC, which were initially fought through allies.

A pan-Hellenic peace project proposed by Pericles failed due to the objections of Sparta, which saw its hegemony over southern Greece jeopardised. Athens remained the decisive Greek naval power, while Sparta held most of the

dominated the territories of southern and central Greece. Ultimately, it was also the allies on both sides who pushed for war

If Hans-Joachim Diesner has a completely different explanation for the causes of the Peloponnesian War, which finally broke out in 431 BC and lasted until 404, this is not decisive for the explanation of a future war between the USA and China because Graham Allison's thesis has found great acceptance in leading circles in the USA. In fact, Allison presents numerous facts in favour of his theory that a rising power poses a threat to the ruling hegemon using the example of China. For example, China's GDP in 1980 was only \$300 billion (7% of America's), but by 2015 it was already \$11,000 billion (61% of America's). In the same period, China's global trade rose from \$40 billion to \$4,000 billion; Chinese exports then already totalled 151% of American exports.

In the decades after 1980, the Chinese economy grew annually by

10 %, which means a doubling of total economic output every seven years. China has already overtaken the USA in key areas: In shipbuilding, the production of steel and aluminium, textiles, mobile phones and computers. In recent years, the "new energies", electric cars and artificial intelligence have been added to this. If China succeeds in increasing its labour productivity over the next few years, this would lead to a GDP that is twice as high as that of the US. This rise of China can certainly be described as terrifying. But will it create the conditions that correspond to the "Thucydides trap"? In my opinion, it is not a question of China replacing the USA as the world's leading power. In the foreseeable future, the United States will probably remain the world's leading political, economic, military and cultural power. The "American model" continues to exert a great attraction. It is therefore not a question of a replacement in global hegemony, but rather of the extent to which China will take a more important place in international affairs than before due to its increased strength.

As much as this dramatic upswing in China was initially made possible by huge Western investments, fears were soon voiced that a new economic superpower in China could also pose a military threat. As early as 2012, when the Chinese defence budget was just a quarter of that of the US, the Economist warned that Beijing could be the world's largest military power in 20 years' time. It would then not only focus on defence, but also take offensive action in connection with Taiwan, for example<sup>(19)</sup> .

President Donald Trump then declared a trade war in 2018 and imposed tariffs on Chinese imports totalling billions. Chinese President Xi accused the USA of waging a "boxing match without rules". Joe Biden then not only intensified the economic war, but also added a new dimension to the conflict over Taiwan. While it had been agreed on the occasion of the normalisation of relations with Beijing that Taiwan is part of China, Biden has now no longer ruled out military support for an independent Taiwan. In any case, the Biden administration's political, economic and military efforts to contain the rise of China have increased.

The West is also trying to exert constant pressure on China by accusing Beijing of human rights violations in Xinjiang and Tibet, as well as the reduction of political rights in Hong Kong. China should instead "Western values" and submit to the order established by the USA after the Second World War. Beijing, for its part, considers it cynical if the Dutch or Japanese governments are urged by Washington to stop selling semiconductors to China "because of the violation of universal values".

In fact, the attempt to impose Western values on the "Middle Kingdom" has gone wrong before. When the Jesuits attempted to proselytise China in the 16th and 17th centuries, their efforts were also accepted because they tried to reconcile Chinese traditions such as ancestor worship or the teachings of Confucius with the Christian faith. Emperor Kangxi was impressed by the Jesuits and even issued an edict of tolerance in 1692, which welcomed the presence of Christian Europeans. When then

However, when Rome ordered the Christian faith to be spread only in its pure, Western form, the project failed miserably. Today, critics accuse the West of applying a double standard. China should be judged by its achievements and not by its political system.

The example of the Peloponnesian War shows very clearly that various causes can lead to war: Political, as emphasised by Graham Allison, or economic, as described by Hans-Joachim Diesner. But Henry Kissinger and Zbigniew Brzezinski have shown that a tough but realistic policy can also succeed in avoiding a major war, even if there are considerable political and economic differences. The extent to which absolute American global dominance can be maintained at a time when the balance of power has changed decisively can of course be questioned. When the new international order was established after the Second World War under the leadership of the USA, China was not an international player in any area, but it is today. It can be assumed that this development is linked to a growing national consciousness in China itself. The transfer of national tendencies into foreign policy can be seen as a sign of new strength, but also as an attempt to cover up internal difficulties and uncertainties.

The war in Ukraine has now shown very clearly that a new system of alliances is emerging internationally. On the one hand, the West, led by the USA, insists that the whole world recognises the rules set by the West. On the other side are those states that have made it possible for Russia to wage the war much longer and more intensively than originally assumed. The French finance minister was not the only one to emphatically declare that Moscow had no chance of withstanding the toughest economic sanctions the world has ever seen. The countries of the new alliance, in which China plays a decisive role, can probably claim as a success the fact that they have managed to withstand enormous political, economic and military pressure from the West. In this sense, Beijing has already won through the war in Ukraine because the USA is no longer the sole leading power in the world.

The whole world would therefore certainly be helped if cooperation between China and America could be intensified in the coming years rather than confrontation. In other words, co-operation in keeping the global economy as stable as possible, protecting the climate and preventing the further proliferation of nuclear weapons. The fight against terrorism and international crime are equally suitable areas of co-operation. After all, the aim should be to save the world and not to destroy it.

## NOTES :

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